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Resumo 
Ao reunir a literatura existente tendo em vista um mais amplo 
debate sobre repatriamento e examinar como diferentes vertentes 
dentro desta  discussão, beneficiam ou restringem, o trabalho 
pretende acrescentar e potencialmente esclarecer  a discussão 
acadêmica e profissional existente sobre o repatriamento a partir de 
coleções de museus, tendo em vista a compreensão de como essas 
interações irão  continuar a definir-se e a desenvolver-se  no futuro. 
Não se trata nem uma justificação nem da exploração de uma 
posição particular sobre esta questão controversa na prática 
museológica, mas sim uma investigação sobre o funcionamento 
interno do processo de repatriamento, da legislação, das obrigações 
profissionais e da discussão que rodeiam esta questão. 
Palavra Chave: Repatriação: Propriedade cultural; Museologia 
 
Abstract 
By bringing together existing literature on the wider repatriation 
debate, and examining how different strands within the discussion 
influence, benefit or constrain one another, it is the hope of the 
author that this work will add to, weave together and potentially 
                                               
1
 Based on work originally presented in partial fulfilment of a M Museology degree 
at the Reinwardt Academie, Amsterdam School of the Arts.  With thanks for their 
support to the Reinwardt Academie, HSP Huygens scholarship programme and 
Paula Assunção dos Santos. 
2 Erin H. Caswell Reinwardt Academy, Amsterdam School of the Arts. 
erin.caswell@gmail.com 
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illuminate existing scholarly and professional discussion of 
repatriation from museum collections, with a view to understanding 
how these interactions will continue to build or develop in future.  
This is neither a justification nor an exploration of a particular stance 
on this contentious issue in museum practice, but rather an 
investigation of the inner workings of the repatriation movement 
and the legislation, professional obligations and discussion which 
surround it.   




Repatriation, as an issue within the arts and heritage sector, is 
both a contentious and a complex one. 3  There are no easy answers 
which apply to every claim for the return of a work of art of item of 
cultural property, and each must be examined on individual merits, 
including legal considerations both modern and historic, competing 
interests on the side of the institution and claimant(s), national or 
institutional policies governing deaccessioning and restitution, the 
benefits of retaining the item versus returning it to its place of 
origin, and whether public opinion may be for or against the return.  
By bringing together existing literature on the wider repatriation 
debate, and examining how different strands within the discussion 
influence, benefit or constrain one another, it is the hope of the 
author that this work will add to, weave together and potentially 
illuminate existing scholarly and professional discussion of 
repatriation from museum collections, with a view to understanding 
how these interactions will continue to build or develop in future.  
                                               
3 Repatriation/Restitution/Return: I have used these terms somewhat 
interchangeably, though the term ‘repatriation’ has been used most often.  By 
doing this I do not wish to enter into the debate on the appropriateness of the 
word, with its perceived connotations of ‘patria’ or an appropriate homeland for 
the material under discussion.  Instead, I have chosen to use the term which I feel is 
used most often, and is thus most recognisable, in reference to the act of 
deaccessioning museum objects and transferring ownership to individuals or 
communities. 
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This is neither a justification nor an exploration of a particular stance 
on this contentious issue in museum practice, but rather an 
investigation of the inner workings of the repatriation movement 
and the legislation, professional obligations and discussion which 
surround it.   
In the following pages, the range of materials currently subject 
to claims for repatriation, or the return of items of cultural property 
to individuals or groups representing previous owners, has been 
divided into categories; namely human remains, antiquities, ‘looted’ 
art and indigenous cultural property.4   While these categories all fall 
under the umbrella of repatriation, they are in fact largely separate 
issues, stemming from different historical circumstances and often 
entailing different solutions.  The hypothesis investigated in this 
work is that, alongside external influences such as indigenous 
movements, economic fluctuations or a political desire to atone for 
unresolved grievances,5 repatriation is also internally stimulated, 
with developments in one area affecting other areas in turn, 
                                               
4 The terms ‘cultural property’, ‘cultural patrimony’ and ‘cultural heritage’ are used 
somewhat interchangeably in the literature on the subject, although different 
interpretations or nuances are possible.  The term ‘cultural property’ is, however, 
used most often, and is the preferred term in this document, although the 
alternatives are also employed in some cases for stylistic reasons.  When works 
have been quoted, the author’s preferred term has been retained. John Henry 
Merryman, “The Public Interest in Cultural Property,” in Thinking About the Elgin 
Marbles: critical essays on cultural property, art and law, ed. John Henry Merryman 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 107; Merryman, “The Public Interest 
in Cultural Property,” 96; Robert K. Paterson, “The “Caring and Sharing” Approach: 
recent progress in the International Law Association to develop draft cultural 
material principles,” International Journal of Cultural Property 12, no. 1 (2005) 
5 John Torpey discusses repatriation as part of a wider tendency to make amends in 
some fashion for past wrongs, as part of a ‘post-utopian’ reaction against the past. 
John Torpey, Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: on reparations politics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).  See also Catherine Bell, 
“Restructuring the Relationship: domestic repatriation and Canadian law reform,” in 
Protection of First Nations Cultural Heritage: laws, policy, and reform, ed. Catherine 
Bell and Robert K. Paterson (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 19; Elazar Barkan, The 
Guilt of Nations: restitution and negotiating historical injustices, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), xxix. 
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whether by the promulgation of legislation, providing arguments 
and moral positions which can be used in multiple debates, or 
through the influencing of public opinion.6  The article looks first at a 
broad outline of the circumstances surround the repatriation of 
indigenous cultural property, and what mechanisms currently 
govern the return of items in different contexts, before examining in 
turn human remains, antiquities and ‘looted’ art.  In each case, after 
providing historic and current context, interactions between the 
contested category and that of indigenous cultural property are 
considered, in order to find both overlaps where interactions occur, 
and the limitations of any such influences between the categories.  
Where broad trends can be distinguished these have been discussed 
in the final section of this work, with a view to understanding which 
interactions between different strands within repatriation will be 
likely to influence museum practice for years to come. 
 
2. The Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Property 
Indigenous cultural property has been taken as the example 
through which the central hypothesis is explored.  This category of 
contested material has been deliberately selected as one with 
various historical, legal and ethical specificities which make for 
interesting crossovers and connections with other categories of 
contested material.  Most of the ethnographic material, sacred 
objects and items of indigenous cultural property now in museum 
collections were collected as part of a colonial project.  There were 
                                               
6
 While the latter term can be interpreted in a variety of ways, I have interpreted 
public opinion throughout this document largely through an analysis of media 
stories, non-specialist/academic publications, and anecdotal evidence of decision-
making based on favourable or unfavourable ‘public opinion’.  The public I envisage 
therefore encompasses both the museum-going public (or other stakeholders) of 
particular institutions, but also the wider public, both national and international, 
who have shared their views on repatriation issues in public forums.  The evidence 
used is thus subjective and qualitative rather than scientific or quantitative, but it is 
my belief that the information gained in this endeavour sheds an interesting light 
on how developments in repatriation are seen by those affected in the widest 
sense. 
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various motivations for colonial or imperial agents, missionaries and 
others to obtain such objects,7 and during the period of colonialism 
and early contact indigenous objects were variously traded, sold 
fairly, sold by individuals who did not possess the right to alienate 
cultural property, stolen, or discovered in an ‘abandoned’ state and 
removed.8  While some collectors were not acting unethically 
according to contemporary Western moral standards, others knew 
even at the time that the removal of certain material from its 
traditional context was forbidden by local laws and traditions, and 
thus described it as ‘trophies’ or ‘plunder’.9  This flow of property 
took place on such a scale, and over such a period of time, that the 
largest collections of cultural property of some peoples exist outside 
their native country.10   
                                               
7 See, for example, Moira G. Simpson, “Revealing and Concealing: museums, 
objects, and the transmission of knowledge in Aboriginal Australia,” in New 
Museum Theory and Practice: an introduction, ed. Janet Marstine (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006), 153-155; Kathleen S. Fine-Dare, Grave Injustice: the American 
Indian repatriation movement and NAGPRA (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2002), 4-5, 14, 33; Richard Pankhurst, “Ethiopia, the Aksum Obelisk, and the 
return of Africa’s Cultural Heritage,” African Affairs 98, no. 391 (1999), 229-231;  
Barbara Lawson, “From Curio to Cultural Document,” in Museums and the Future of 
Collecting, 2nd ed., ed. Simon J. Knell (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 103-104, 108. 
8 Fine-Dare, 4-5, 34; Edmund J. Ladd, “A Zuni Perspective on Repatriation,” in The 
Future of the Past: archaeologists, Native Americans, and repatriation, ed. Tamara 
L. Bray (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001), 107. 
9 Tom Griffiths, Hunters and Collectors: the antiquarian imagination in Australia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53.  See also Cressida Fforde, 
Collecting the Dead: archaeology and the reburial issue (London: Duckworth, 2004), 
59, 61-64; Paul Tapsell, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: human remains at the Auckland 
Museum – Te Papa Whakahiku,” in Looking Reality in the Eye: museums and social 
responsibility, ed. Robert R. Janes and Gerald T. Conaty (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2005), 161, 164; David Hurst Thomas, Skull Wars: Kennewick Man, 
archaeology, and the battle for Native American identity (New York: Basic Books, 
2000), 56; Cressida Fforde, “Collection, Repatriation and Identity,” in The Dead and 
their Possessions: repatriation in principle, policy and practice, ed. Cressida Fforde 
et al. (London: Routledge, 2002), 27;  Janna Thompson, “Cultural Property, 
Restitution and Value,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2003): 254.  
10 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 257-258; Patty Gerstenblith, “The Public Interest in 
the Restitution of Cultural Objects,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 16 
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No matter the circumstances of acquisition, however, the fact 
remains that the basis of many modern collections of ethnographic 
material continues to lie in the active collection of indigenous 
cultural property during the height of colonialism in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  Although many indigenous people 
were unwilling to part with items, and in some cases have sustained 
ongoing campaigns for their return, unequal colonial or ‘First 
World’/‘Third World’ (and ‘Fourth World’) power relations have 
ensured that, with some exceptions, such collections have largely 
remained intact.11  While those who advocate the return of other 
contested categories such as human remains or World War II-related 
items can rely on a certain moral and emotive power, at least 
rhetorically speaking, and while some categories of antiquities 
benefit from substantial legal protections, indigenous cultural 
property appears to be the least-discussed and least-repatriated 
category of contested material in museum and institutional 
collections.12   
                                                                                                   
(2000-2001): 206; Lissant Bolton, “The Object in View: Aborigines, Melanesians, 
and museums,” in Museums and Source Communities: a Routledge reader, ed. 
Laura Peers and Alison K. Brown (London: Routledge, 2003), 48;  Walter R. Echo-
Hawk, “Preface,” in Mending the Circle: a Native American repatriation guide: 
understanding and implementing NAGPRA and the official Smithsonian and other 
repatriation policies, ed. Barbara Meister (New York: American Indian Ritual Object 
Repatriation Foundation, 1996). 
11 Joe Watkins, “Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists and “Intra-nationalists”: 
who’s right and whose right?,” International Journal of Cultural Property 12 (2008): 
12, 79; Moira G. Simpson, Making Representations: museums in the post-colonial 
era, 2
nd
 ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 178; Isabel McBryde, “Introduction,” in Who 
Owns the Past?, ed. Isabel McBryde (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
87-89; Moira Simpson, Museums and Repatriation: an account of contested items in 
museum collections in the UK, with comparative material from other countries 
(London: The Museums Association, 1997), 1-3.  
12 Although the body of literature is more substantial now, the situation does not 
appear to have substantially altered since similar claims were made by Christian 
Feest in 1995. Christian F. Feest, ““Repatriation”: a European view on the question 
of restitution of Native American artifacts,” European Review of Native American 
Studies 9, no. 2 (1995).  See also Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh, “Repatriation and the 
Burdens of Proof,” Museum Anthropology 36:2 (2013), 108-109. 
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The importance of addressing separately the issue of the 
repatriation of indigenous cultural property has been acknowledged 
by some international organisations, although it has not yet been 
fully resolved.  The 1983 statement by the United Nations General 
Assembly on the return or restitution of cultural property to 
countries of origin, for example, while not specifically naming 
indigenous cultural property, supports an extra-legal, collaborative 
approach suitable to the resolution of such claims.13  Another 
example of an international effort to aid the resolution of cultural 
property disputes are the Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual 
Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material adopted in 2006 by the 
International Law Association.14  While neither response is designed 
to be applied exclusively to claims made by indigenous peoples, they 
can be taken as recognition of the need for approaches for the 
resolution of claims that fall outside existing frameworks for 
disputed cultural material.15  This principle has also been applied 
                                               
13 United Nations General Assembly, “Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to 
the Countries of Origin,” available online at United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/38/a38r034.htm (accessed 26 May 2015).  
See also United Nations General Assembly, “United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” available online at United Nations, http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/467/34/PDF/N1146734.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed 26 May 2015); Michael Pickering, “Repatriation, Rhetoric and Reality: the 
repatriation of Australian Indigenous human remains and sacred objects,” Journal 
of the Australian Registrars Committee 41 (2002), 16-17; David James Butts, “Māori 
and Museums: the politics of indigenous recognition” (Ph.D. thesis, Massey 
University, 2003), 45; Peter H. Welsh, “Repatriation and Cultural Preservation: 
potent objects, potent pasts,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 54 
(1991-1992), 853; Erica-Irena Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People 
(New York: United Nations, 1997).    
14 James A. R. Nafziger, “The Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection 
and Transfer of Cultural Material,” Chicago Journal of International Law 8, no. 1 
(2007), 157-158; Remarks by Robert K. Paterson in  James A. R. Nafziger et al., 
“International Cultural Law: looking back and looking ahead,” American Society of 
International Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (2006), 328. 
15
 See also an alternative judicial solution to international cultural heritage disputes 
in Alessandro Chechi, “Evaluating the Establishment of an International Cultural 
Heritage Court,” Art, Antiquity and Law 18:1 (2013), 31-57. 
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directly to the issue of indigenous cultural property by organisations 
such as the American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation Fund, 
founded by Elizabeth Sackler in 1991 in order to bypass legal, 
political and other issues and, in essence, achieve repatriation to 
Native American communities through purchasing and returning 
objects.16  International documents which do specifically deal with 
the repatriation of indigenous cultural property, such as the 2007 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
have their own issues of scope, interpretation and 
implementation.17  The number of historic circumstances leading to 
collection of objects, as well as the variety of approaches in 
attempting to secure their repatriation, thus makes indigenous 
cultural property an interesting testing ground for interactions with 
other areas of the wider repatriation debate. 
2.1 Human Remains and the Return of Indigenous Cultural 
Property 
 Common sense would perhaps dictate that the type of 
repatriation most likely to affect developments in the return of 
indigenous cultural property is that of human remains.  Even if the 
remains of indigenous people are not the most heavily represented 
in all museum and institutional collections,18 they have certainly 
                                               
16
 Elizabeth Sackler, Martin Sullivan and Richard Hill, “Three Voices for 
Repatriation,” in Agnes Tabah, Native American Collections and Repatriation 
(Washington, D.C.: American Association of Museums, 1993), 136-137; Elizabeth 
Sackler, “About the American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation Foundation,” in 
Mending the Circle: a Native American repatriation guide: understanding and 
implementing NAGPRA and the official Smithsonian and other repatriation policies, 
ed. Barbara Meister (New York: American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation 
Foundation, 1996); Simpson, Making Representations, 223; Andrew Gulliford, 
“Bones of Contention: the repatriation of Native American human remains,” Public 
Historian 18, no. 4 (1996), 31; Feest, 39; June Camille Bush Raines, “One is Missing: 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: an overview and analysis,” 
American Indian Law Review 17, no. 2 (1992), 662.   
17
 Shea Esterling, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: the restitution of cultural 
property in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 
Art, Antiquity and Law 18:4 (2013), 323-343. 
18 Comments by Jane Hubert, Sebastian Payne and Tristam Besterman in Tiffany 
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become the most controversial over the last few decades, with the 
rise of indigenous rights movements, changing levels of support for 
indigenous issues in settler societies and the prominence of 
indigenous concerns on international agendas.19   In the same 
period that many indigenous cultural objects were being traded or 
collected, indigenous human remains began to be collected in many 
instances as a convergence between the advancement of scientific 
theories based on physical racial differences and the opportunities 
and interests of imperial expansion and colonialism.  Theories of 
human evolution developed in the nineteenth century, using the 
arguments of Darwin and others to create a scale of social and 
physical development with Caucasians or Europeans at its 
pinnacle.20  This was useful to those European societies which were 
then building empires, and their legal and physical domination of 
these same subjects allowed for the relatively easy collection of 
specimens for scientists involved in early studies of ethnography or 
                                                                                                   
Jenkins et al., “Transcript of the Panel Discussion ‘Human Remains: objects to study 
or ancestors to bury?’,” available online at Institute of Ideas, 
http://instituteofideas.com/documents/transcriptsandreports/HumanRemains.pdf 
(accessed 26 May 2015), 1, 3, 9; Fforde, Collecting the Dead, 12, 26. 
 19 Esterling, 324.  In some instances, I have referred to ‘settler societies’ as 
distinct from colonial or post-colonial societies in general.  In using this term, I am 
referring to “...the overseas extensions of the states of Western Europe, places that 
were established as colonies or outposts of Euro empires in which existing 
indigenous populations were dislocated by settler-colonists.”  The different 
historical and contemporary experiences of indigenous peoples in settler societies 
versus those of self-governing groups warrant the distinction being drawn.  The 
United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the settler 
societies most often referred to.  Welsh, 837; Thomas F. King, Cultural Resource 
Laws and Practice: an introductory guide (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998), 
16, 19, 22, 149-150.  
20 Conal McCarthy, Exhibiting Māori: a history of colonial cultures of display 
(Wellington: Te Papa Press, 2007), 21; Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, International Law, 
Museums and the Return of Cultural Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 8; Devon A. Mihesuah, “Introduction,” in Repatriation Reader: who 
owns American Indian remains? (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 
2-3.  
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physical anthropology.21  The remains of more indigenous 
individuals were collected as curiosities, including toi moko 
(tattooed Māori heads) and shrunken heads.22  Still other indigenous 
people were treated as curiosities and displayed while still alive, and 
were then preserved and remained in museum collections after 
death.23  The origins of the debate over human remains repatriation, 
referred to in some cases as the ‘reburial movement’, are often 
traced to wider indigenous rights movements or indigenous cultural 
renaissances of the 1960s to 1980s.24  After long periods of unequal 
power relationships, a new political consciousness developed 
amongst many indigenous groups, leading them to fight for 
recognition and redress.25  For some such groups, the repatriation 
                                               
21 D. Thomas, 56; Fforde, “Collection, Repatriation and Identity,” 27; conversation 
with Paul Tapsell, 9 March 2010. 
22 Tapsell, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” 153, 156-157.  Cases involving toi moko in 
museum collections are still topical, as evidenced by the debate over a repatriation 
from the collection of the city of Rouen and attempted sales at auction in recent 
decades. Olivier Amiel, “A Māori Head: public domain?,” trans. Marine Bel and 
Michael Berger, International Journal of Cultural Property 15, no. 3 (2008); Fforde, 
Collecting the Dead, 70; Manlio Frigo, “The International Symposium “From 
Anatomic Collections to Objects of Worship: Conservation and Exhibition of Human 
Remains in Museums,” Paris (France), February 22-23, 2008,” International Journal 
of Cultural Property 15 (2008): 437.  Conal McCarthy points out, however, that 
indigenous people’s response to human remains on display may be more complex 
than assumed. McCarthy, Exhibiting Māori, 33. 
23 D. Thomas, 77-101; Fine-Dare, 18; Henry J. Sockbeson, “The Larsen Bay 
Repatriation and Common Errors of Anthropologists,” in Reckoning with the Dead: 
the Larsen Bay repatriation and the Smithsonian Institution, ed. Tamara L. Bray and 
Thomas W. Killion (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1994), 159.  
24 See, for example, Nicholas Thomas, Possessions: indigenous art/colonial culture 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), 187-188; D. Thomas, 198-199, 209-215; 
Simpson, “Revealing and Concealing,” 166; Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 160-161, 
188-189; Butts, “Māori and Museums,” 18-19, 83-87.  Kathleen Fine-Dare traces the 
origins of the modern repatriation movement back much further in the case of 
Native American resistance and activism. Fine-Dare, 47-84. 
25
 I am not suggesting that all indigenous movements (or groups) are identical or 
even similar in their form, origin or desired outcomes, but merely that the political 
awareness and activism of several indigenous groups can be seen to have 
undergone great transformations at this time. Cf. Gulliford, “Bones of Contention,” 
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and reburial of their ancestors became an issue of combined 
symbolic, social, religious and political importance.26  The existence 
of high-profile cases of repatriation or reburial in turn led to 
increased debate of the issue in political, professional and public 
spheres, and in some cases the development of policies for 
institutions and professional organizations, as well as new legislation 
which governs the disposition of human remains.  
The debate over the repatriation of human remains has not, 
however, been concluded, by any stretch of the imagination.  
Currently, the issue tends to be portrayed as one which pits 
scientists defending their right to use collections of human remains 
for medical and anthropological research against communities who 
are determined, for reasons noble or political, to remove all such 
remains from the public domain.27  As in other areas of the 
repatriation debate generally, there is a recurrent fear that if some 
claims for the repatriation of remains are acquiesced to, then many 
collections will soon be reduced to nothing.28 Generally, however, it 
is reasonable to state that more museum professionals now view 
repatriation of human remains positively than would once have 
been the case, many repatriations of such material have been 
successfully carried out, and these interactions have sometimes led 
to ongoing positive relationships between museums and their 
                                                                                                   
133-134; Sonia Atalay, “Multivocality and Indigenous Archaeologies,” in Evaluating 
Multiple Narratives: beyond nationalist, colonialist, imperialist archaeologies, ed. 
Junko Habu et al. (New York: Springer, 2008); Paul Tapsell, “Taonga, Marae, Whenua 
– Negotiating Custodianship: a Maori tribal response to the Museum of New 
Zealand,” in National Museums: negotiating histories: conference proceedings, ed. 
Darryl McIntyre and Kirsten Wehner (Canberra: National Museum of Australia, 
2001), 114, 117-118. 
26 Frigo, “The International Symposium,” 438. 
27 See, for example, Stephen Kinzer, “Museums and Tribes: a tricky truce,” New York 
Times, 24 December 2000: 21; Mark Henderson, “Museum Fears Losing Bodies of 
Evidence,” The Times (London), 10 May 2004. 
28
 See, for example, Ann M. Kakaliouras, “When Remains are “Lost”: thoughts on 
collections, repatriation, and research in American Physical Anthropology,” Curator 
57:2 (2014), 214-215. 
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source communities.29   Discussion of the repatriation of human 
remains in the public sphere is generally in favour of returning 
remains to communities or descendents.30 
This evolving debate over the repatriation of human 
remains has been reflected in a number of countries by 
developments in legislation and in institutional or professional 
policies or codes of ethics.  The piece of national legislation most 
                                               
29 See, for example, Council of Australian Museum Associations, Previous 
Possessions, New Obligations: policies for museums in Australia and Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples (Melbourne: Museums Australia, 1993), 9, 11-14; 
Robert K. Paterson, “Ancestral Remains in Institutional Collections: proposals for 
reform,” in Protection of First Nations Cultural Heritage: laws, policy, and reform, 
ed. Catherine Bell and Robert K. Paterson (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 156; 
Simpson, Museums and Repatriation, 38-48, 80; D. Thomas, 216; Mihesuah, 
“Introduction,” 4; Gulliford, “Bones of Contention,” 120-121; Richard Hill, 
“Reflections of a Native Repatriator,” in Mending the Circle: a Native American 
repatriation guide: understanding and implementing NAGPRA and the official 
Smithsonian and other repatriation policies, ed. Barbara Meister (New York: 
American Indian Ritual Object Repatriation Foundation, 1996), 82; Deanne 
Hanchant, “Practicalities in the Return of Remains: conflict in the use of heritage in 
the modern world,” in The Dead and their Possessions: repatriation in principle, 
policy and practice, ed. Cressida Fforde et al. (London: Routledge, 2002); Simpson, 
Making Representations, 231; Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 202; Elisabeth Tooker, 
“A Note on the Return of Eleven Wampum Belts to the Six Nations Iroquois 
Confederacy on Grand River, Canada,” Ethnohistory 45, no. 2 (1998), 220, 232-233. 
Such policies have been developed even for those museums where large categories 
of material can be claimed for repatriation under legislation.  This is the case, for 
example, in the United States’ National Museum of the American Indian. Andrew 
Gulliford, “Curation and Repatriation of Sacred and Tribal Objects,” Public Historian 
14, no. 3 (1992), 24-25, 32-33; Nancy B. Rosoff, “Integrating Native Views into 
Museum Procedures: hope and practice at the National Museum of the American 
Indian,” in Museums and Source Communities: a Routledge reader, ed. Laura Peers 
and Alison K. Brown (London: Routledge, 2003).   
30 Comments by Jane Hubert in Jenkins, 2; Mary M. Brooks and Claire Rumsey, 
“‘Who Knows the Fate of His Bones?’: rethinking the body on display: object, art or 
human remains,” in Museum Revolutions: how museums change and are changed, 
ed. Simon J. Knell et al. (London: Routledge, 2007); Michael Pickering, “Where To 
From Here?: repatriation of indigenous human remains and ‘The Museum’,” in 
Museum Revolutions: how museums change and are changed, ed. Simon J. Knell et 
al. (London: Routledge, 2007), 256-257. 
Cadernos de Sociomuseologia- 5 -2015                                             93 
 
often discussed in relation to human remains repatriation is the 
Unites States’ Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act (NAGPRA) of 1990, which built on an increasing number of 
institutional policies and state legislation favourable to the 
protection or repatriation of human remains,31 and provides for the 
dissemination of information, repatriation of all remains from 
federally-funded institutions upon proof of cultural affiliation 
(including remains newly discovered on federal lands), and the 
repatriation of certain categories of indigenous cultural property.32  
                                               
31 See, for example, discussion of repatriation from the collections of the 
Smithsonian Institution’s collections, including the ‘Larsen Bay’ repatriation (for 
which negotiations began in 1987) in Gulliford, “Bones of Contention,” 138; 
Sockbeson; Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, 193-194; Donald J. Ortner, “Scientific 
Policy and Public Interest: perspectives on the Larsen Bay repatriation case,” in 
Reckoning with the Dead: the Larsen Bay repatriation and the Smithsonian 
Institution, ed. Tamara L. Bray and Thomas W. Killion (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1994); Gordon L. Pullar, “The Qikertarmiut and the 
Scientist: fifty years of clashing world views,” in Reckoning with the Dead: the 
Larsen Bay repatriation and the Smithsonian Institution, ed. Tamara L. Bray and 
Thomas W. Killion (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1994); Tamara L. Bray 
and Lauren Guttenplan Grant, “The Concept of Cultural Affiliation and its Legal 
Significance in the Larsen Bay Repatriation,” in Reckoning with the Dead: the Larsen 
Bay repatriation and the Smithsonian Institution, ed. Tamara L. Bray and Thomas W. 
Killion (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1994); Melinda A. Zeder, 
“Repatriation at the National Museum of Natural History: present and future,” in 
Reckoning with the Dead: the Larsen Bay repatriation and the Smithsonian 
Institution, ed. Tamara L. Bray and Thomas W. Killion (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1994); Thomas W. Killion and Tamara L. Bray, “Looking 
Toward Larsen Bay: evolving attitudes at the Smithsonian Institution,” in Reckoning 
with the Dead: the Larsen Bay repatriation and the Smithsonian Institution, ed. 
Tamara L. Bray and Thomas W. Killion (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 
1994).  
32 Jane Hubert and Cressida Fforde, “Introduction: the reburial issue in the twenty-
first century,” in The Dead and Their Possessions: repatriation in principle, policy 
and practice, ed. Cressida Fforde et al. (London: Routledge, 2002), 6-9; Heard 
Museum, “Sample of Summaries: Hualapai collections in the Heard Museum,” 
reproduced in Mending the Circle: a Native American repatriation guide: 
understanding and implementing NAGPRA and the official Smithsonian and other 
repatriation policies, ed. Barbara Meister (New York: American Indian Ritual Object 
Repatriation Foundation, 1996); Patty Gerstenblith, “Identity and Cultural Property: 
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While NAGPRA is currently the most far-reaching legislation dealing 
with the repatriation of human remains, however, it is not the only 
example, and other countries and international organizations have 
also instituted official or unofficial policies of returning remains to 
indigenous communities.33  One example of the latter is in the 
Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation Programme run from the National 
Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa and funded by the 
New Zealand government.34  The goals of the programme include 
negotiation with foreign institutions, research, care and domestic 
repatriation of returned remains and constant consultation, 
following the belief that “...iwi involvement assists in the 
reconnection between ancestors and their descendants.”35  Even 
                                                                                                   
the protection of cultural property in the United States,” Boston University Law 
Review 75 (1995): 622-627; H. Marcus Price III, Disputing the Dead: U.S. law on 
aboriginal remains and grave goods (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 
1991), 24-25, 29-31, 43-115. 
33 See, for example, Council of Australian Museum Associations; Museums 
Australia, Continuing Cultures, Ongoing Responsibilities: principles and guidelines 
for Australian museums working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural 
heritage (Canberra: Museums Australia, 2005); Assembly of First Nations and 
Canadian Museums Association, Turning the Page: forging new partnerships 
between museums and First Peoples (Ottawa: Task Force on Museums and First 
Peoples, 1992); Bell, “Restructuring the Relationship,” 16, 45-46, 56; Paterson, 
“Ancestral Remains in Institutional Collections,” 163-164; Butts, “Māori and 
Museums,” 51-53; Catherine Bell, “Aboriginal Claims to Cultural Property in Canada: 
a comparative legal analysis of the repatriation debate,” American Indian Law 
Review 17, no. 2 (1992), 457. Even in the United States, where NAGPRA is in effect, 
some commentators see certain institutional policies on repatriation as being more 
flexible and effective than the legislation itself. Thomas H. Boyd and Jonathan Haas, 
“The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: prospects for new 
partnerships between museums and Native American groups,” in Agnes Tabah, 
Native American Collections and Repatriation (Washington, D.C.: American 
Association of Museums, 1993), 97-98. 
34 Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, The Karanga Aotearoa Repatriation 
Programme: resources 1-11 (Wellington: Museum of New Zealand Te Papa 
Tongarewa, n.d.), Resource 2.2, Resource 11.1; Paterson, “Ancestral Remains in 
Institutional Collections,” 158. 
35 Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Resource 1.1, 1.2, Resource 3.1, 
Resource 5.1.  The repatriation of Māori or Moriori cultural property (taonga) is 
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without repatriation legislation, therefore, far-reaching results can 
be and have been achieved.36 
Points of commonality between human remains and 
indigenous cultural property in museum collections are not hard to 
find, with items often representing the same cultures, or even 
burials.  Explorers, missionaries and colonial officials had, in many 
cases, fairly easy access to indigenous cultural property, whether 
this property was traded, found ‘abandoned’, stolen, looted or 
bought.  A further point of comparison is the argument used to 
refute the repatriation of both human remains and indigenous 
cultural property which acknowledges that collection methods were 
sometimes unethical by historical or modern standards, but argues 
that the primary standard by which the disposition of artefacts 
should be considered is their educational or research value in their 
current location.37  Even discounting such appeals to universal 
values, the debate over the repatriation of indigenous human 
remains has affected the repatriation of indigenous cultural 
property in certain ways, both concrete and rhetorical.  Firstly, the 
                                                                                                   
specifically excluded from the purview of the programme. Ibid., Resource 10.1.  Iwi: 
a traditional Māori tribal group based on shared descent from a named ancestor or 
ancestors.  See also Barkan, Guilt of Nations, 170-171; Johnny P. Flynn and Gary 
Laderman, “Purgatory and the Powerful Dead: a case study of Native American 
repatriation,” Religion and American Culture 4, no. 1 (1994). 
36 See also the Vermillion Accord on Human Remains, adopted by the World 
Archaeological Congress in 1989, as an example of a human remains policy of an 
international professional organisation. World Archaeological Congress, “Vermillion 
Accord on Human Remains,” available online at World Archaeological Congress, 
http://www.worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/about-wac/codes-of-ethics/168-
vermillion (accessed 26 May 2015); Simpson, Museums and Repatriation, 78;  
Paterson, “Ancestral Remains in Institutional Collections,” 168; Larry J. Zimmerman, 
“A Decade After the Vermillion Accord: what has changed and what has not?,” in 
The Dead and their Possessions: repatriation in principle, policy and practice, ed. 
Cressida Fforde et al. (London: Routledge, 2002).   
37
 See, for example, Feest; Timothy McKeown, “Implementing a ‘True Compromise’: 
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act after ten years,” in The 
Dead and their Possessions: repatriation in principle, policy and practice, ed. 
Cressida Fforde et al. (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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similar origins of many collections of indigenous human remains and 
cultural property have led, in some instances, to them being 
incorporated into the same legislation or guidelines, for example 
under NAGPRA.38  NAGPRA does not deal only with cultural property 
associated with burial practices, but goes much further, including 
“...specific ceremonial objects which are needed by traditional 
Native American religious leaders for the practice of traditional 
Native American religions by their present day adherents...” and 
objects “...having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural 
importance central to the Native American group or culture itself, 
rather than property owned by an individual Native American...”.39  
This includes the return of indigenous cultural property newly 
discovered on federally controlled land, with preference for 
returning it to indigenous descendents or communities rather than 
assigning it to museums.40  In the United States, therefore, 
advocates for the repatriation of indigenous cultural property have 
benefited greatly from developments within the wider repatriation 
debate, specifically within the movement to have human remains 
returned. 
A similar convergence between the repatriation of human 
remains and that of indigenous cultural property can be seen in a 
number of institutional policy documents and ethical guidelines 
related to human remains which also deal with cultural property 
associated with burials, or even go as far as including historic 
photographs or museum records related to human remains.41  The 
                                               
38 U.S. Department of the Interior, “Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (as amended),” available online at National NAGPRA, 
http://www.nps.gov/history/local-law/FHPL_NAGPRA.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015), 
166-167. 
39 Ibid., 167. 
40 Ibid., 169-172. 
41 National Museum of Australia, “Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Human 
Remains Policy version 2.1,” available online at National Museum of Australia, 
http://www.nma.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1412/POL-C-
011_Aboriginal_and_Torres_Strait_Islander_human_remains-2.2_public.pdf 
(accessed 26 May 2015); National Museum of Australia, “Non-Australian Indigenous 
Human Remains Policy,” available online at National Museum of Australia, 
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implication is that certain categories of indigenous cultural property 
are, by their nature, deserving of the same level of respect, 
treatment and consideration for repatriation as the remains with 
which they were once associated.  It is important to note, however, 
that not all policies advocate for, or even mention in detail, the 
special consideration or repatriation of indigenous cultural property 
in conjunction with that of human remains.42  There are other 
factors at play here: for example, the incorporation of the category 
of cultural property into legislation or policies on human remains 
appears to be affected by whether or not the process takes place 
within a settler society, and is thus influenced more directly by the 
indigenous peoples in question than is the case for other countries 
with ethnographic collections.  There are also legislative constraints 
in some countries, such as the various statutes governing national 
museums including the British Museum Act of 1963 where the 
presumption is against the deaccessioning of any museum artefact.  
Even within the United Kingdom, however, human remains are 
subject to different rules on ownership and return.43  Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                   
http://www.nma.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/1461/POL-G-024_Non-
Aust_Indigenous_human_remains-1.0-public.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015); Historic 
Scotland, “The Treatment of Human Remains in Archaeology,” available online at 
Historic Scotland, http://www.historic-scotland.gov.uk/the-treatment-of-human-
remains-archaeology.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015); Royal Cornwall Museum, “Policy 
on Human Remains, Royal Cornwall Museum, Royal Institute of Cornwall, Truro,” 
available online at Royal Cornwall Museum, 
http://www.royalcornwallmuseum.org.uk/pages/documents/HumanRemainsPolicy.
pdf (accessed 26 May 2015), 2, 4, 7-8. 
42
 University of Manchester, “Policy Document for the Strategic Development of the 
Manchester Museum: Policy on Human Remains,” available online at The 
Manchester Museum, 
http://www.museum.manchester.ac.uk/aboutus/reportspolicies/fileuploadmax10m
b,120796,en.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015); Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, “Guidance for the Care of Human Remains in Museums,” available online at 
British Museum (www.britishmuseum.org), 
https://www.britishmuseum.org/pdf/DCMS%20Guide.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015), 
19. 
43 Edward Manisty and Julian Smith, “The Deaccessioning of Objects from Public 
Institutions: legal and related considerations,” Art, Antiquity and Law 15:1 (2010), 
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laws or policies in which cultural property is included as an issue to 
be considered alongside human remains can still be seen as a 
developing trend which allows some documents to reach outside 
the confines of the category for which they were originally designed 
and affect the wider repatriation debate.  Examples abound of 
indigenous cultural property which has been successfully 
repatriated under legislation or policies designed first and foremost 
to deal with the issue of human remains.  Under the categories of 
cultural property established by NAGPRA, in particular, it has been 
possible for indigenous peoples to make successful requests for the 
repatriation of important artefacts not directly associated with 
burials.44  Cases of institutional policies leading to the repatriation of 
                                                                                                   
71-74; United Kingdom Parliament, “British Museum Act 1963,” available online at 
British Museum, http://www.britishmuseum.org/PDF/BM1963Act.pdf (accessed 26 
May 2015); United Kingdom Parliament, “Human Tissue Act 2004,” available online 
at legislation.gov.uk, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/30/pdfs/ukpga_20040030_en.pdf  
(accessed 26 May 2015); Simpson, Making Representations, 227; Fforde, Collecting 
the Dead, 119-123, 126-127. Museums in the United Kingdom are often accused of 
‘hiding behind’ statutes barring them against deaccessioning, rather than 
attempting to lift them, while uncertainty over museums’ powers of deaccessioning 
items from their collections has led in recent years to the preparation of reports on 
the extent of the issue and the formulation of guidelines to deal with requests, as 
well as provisions under the Human Tissue Act 2004. Norman Palmer, Museums 
and the Holocaust: law, principles and practice (Leicester: Institute of Art and Law, 
2000), 26-27. Simpson, Museums and Repatriation; Jane Weeks and Valerie Bott, 
Scoping Survey of Historic Human Remains in English Museums: undertaken on 
behalf of the Ministerial Working Group on Human Remains (London: Ministerial 
Working Group on Human Remains, 2003; Jane Legget, Restitution and 
Repatriation: guidelines for good practice (London: Museums and Galleries 
Commission, 2000); United Kingdom Parliament, “Human Tissue Act 2004”; Fforde, 
Collecting the Dead, 129-132, 135-138, 140-150; Paterson, “Ancestral Remains in 
Institutional Collections,” 167, 169-170 
44 For an early example of a successful repatriation, see Joe Watkins, “Artefactual 
Awareness: Spiro Mounds, grave goods and politics,” in The Dead and their 
Possessions: repatriation in principle, policy and practice, ed. Cressida Fforde et al. 
(London: Routledge, 2002), 149-150; Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural 
Treasures, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 174-176; Patty 
Gerstenblith, “Museum Practice: legal issues,” in A Companion to Museum Studies, 
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both human remains and associated grave goods can also be 
found.45   
In addition to this concrete influence on the practice of the 
repatriation of indigenous cultural property, the discussion 
surrounding the return of human remains to descendents or 
communities has also influenced how the public views the issue.  
This can be seen, for example, in articles written for the public 
domain which combine the issues of the repatriation of human 
remains and that of indigenous cultural property, either by citing 
examples of both, or by employing the same rhetoric, vocabulary 
and arguments.46    To the reader of such articles, human remains 
and indigenous cultural property in museums form one and the 
same, or at the very least related, issues.47  It therefore becomes 
apparent that the repatriation of indigenous cultural property is 
influenced to a significant extent by the legislation and policies 
governing, practice of and support for the repatriation of human 
                                                                                                   
ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 453. 
45  Museum Victoria, “Annual Report 2003/2004,” available online at Museum 
Victoria, http://museumvictoria.com.au/pages/2877/2003-2004/2003-
2004research.pdf (accessed 26 May 2015), 73; Russell Thornton, “Repatriation as 
Healing the Wounds of the Trauma of History: Cases of Native Americans in the 
United States of America,” in The Dead and Their Possessions: repatriation in 
principle, policy and practice, ed. Cressida Fforde et al. (London: Routledge, 2002), 
22-23; Mark O’Neill, “Repatriation and its Discontents: the Glasgow Experience,” in 
Who Owns Objects?: the ethics and politics of collecting cultural artefacts, ed. 
Eleanor Robson (Oxford: Oxbow, 2006), 112-113. 
46 Patrick O’Driscoll, “Law to Return Indian Remains Bogged Down,” USA Today, 9 
March 1998: 01.A; Anon., “Editorial: Indians have rights to relics,” Denver Post, 7 
September 2003: E.06; Richard Weizel, “From Hallowed Ground Conn. Tribe Wants 
Return of Artifacts From Graves,” Boston Globe, 10 January 1998: B.1; Anon., 
“Museum Set to Lose Indian Treasures,” New York Times, 19 February 1993: A12. 
47 See, for example, Gabriella Coslovich, “At Odds on the Art of Possession,” Sydney 
Morning Herald, 19 January 2008; Rita Beamish, “Artifacts Suspended in Cultural 
Tension: Native Hawaiians vie with museum,” Washington Post, 1 June 2003, A03; 
Tickey Pule, Director of the National Museum of Botswana, quoted in Rachel L. 
Swarns, “Africa Rejoices as a Wandering Soul Finds Rest,” New York Times, 6 
October 2000: A.4; Elaine Sciolino, “French Debate: is Maori head body part or 
art?,” New York Times, 26 October 2007; Kinzer; Henderson. 
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remains from institutional collections.  This is in some ways a self-
reinforcing process.  As more legislation and policies are written in 
support of the repatriation of human remains (and some categories 
of cultural property), there are more instances of repatriation in 
practice, and these gain a higher public profile, again with some 
inclusion of cultural property into the discussion.   A number of 
authors have commented on the influence of favourable public 
opinion in obtaining positive outcomes for specific repatriation 
claims, and it can also be posited that further legislation and policies 
favouring the return of indigenous human remains and cultural 
property are more likely to be successfully implemented if policy-
makers have the support of their respective publics behind them.   
 
2.2 Antiquities and the Return of Indigenous Cultural Property.   
 A brief survey of written sources on the issue of repatriation 
from museum collections would lead some to believe that it is 
synonymous with a handful of claims for the return of high-profile 
antiquities.48   Of these, the most prominent, with a body of written 
and verbal debate stretching back almost 200 years, are the Elgin 
Marbles, long displayed in the British Museum.49  Since their 
controversial arrival in the United Kingdom and purchase by the 
British Museum in 1816,50  the debate over where the Marbles 
                                               
48 See, for example, Mary Ellen O’Connell and Sara DePaul, “Report on the 
Conference: Imperialism, Art and Restitution,” International Journal of Cultural 
Property 12 (2005), 489; Derek Fincham, “Transnational Forfeiture of the Getty 
Bronze,” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 32:2 (2014), 471-472; 
Thompson, 251; Simpson, Museums and Repatriation, 2. 
 49 While the selection of one of these terms over the other is sometimes 
used to show support for or opposition to the return of this collection of objects to 
Greece, I have used the term ‘Elgin Marbles’ to refer to those fragments removed 
by Lord Elgin in the nineteenth century and now housed in the British Museum, 
while the term ‘Parthenon Marbles’ is used to refer to the surviving elements of 
decoration as a whole. 
50
 Anon., “Editorial: return the Parthenon Marbles,” New York Times, 2 February 
2002: A.18; George Gordon, Lord Byron, The Poetical Works of Lord Byron (London: 
Ward, Lock & Co., 1882), 12-14; John Henry Merryman, “Thinking About the Elgin 
Marbles,” in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: critical essays on cultural property, 
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should reside has been simmering and developing, with new 
momentum occasionally added.51  The case of the Elgin Marbles is 
often cited as the most influential repatriation issue to date with 
opinions, often polarized, expressed in almost all imaginable forms, 
including a poetic turn by Lord Byron.52  It also takes on importance 
as a test subject in a field which is heavily dominated by the 
discussion of precedent and the fear of museum storehouse being 
emptied by a tidal wave of claims for return.53   
Perhaps more important than the effect of the Elgin Marbles 
debate on the idea of precedents in repatriation, however, is the 
                                                                                                   
art and law, ed. John Henry Merryman (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
43, 45; Roger Atwood, Stealing History: tomb raiders, smugglers, and the looting of 
the ancient world (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2004), 136-137. See also Greenfield, 
57. 
51 Anon., “Stones to Die For: as pressure increases on Britain to return the Elgin 
Marbles, British excuses for refusing to do so are growing thinner,” The Economist 
354, no. 8162, 18 March 2000: 85; Patrick O’Driscoll, “Ancient Art at Center of 
Dispute: portion of fabled ‘Parthenon Marbles’ on display in Britain,” USA Today, 26 
August 2004: D.04; Anthee Carassava, “In Athens, Museum is an Olympian Feat,” 
New York Times, 20 June 2009: C1. 
52 See, for example, Christopher Hitchens, ed., The Elgin Marbles: should they be 
returned to Greece? 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1997); Timothy Webb, “Appropriating 
the Stones: the “Elgin Marbles” and the English national taste,” in Claiming the 
Stones/Naming the Bones: cultural property and the negotiation of national and 
ethnic identity, ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (Los Angeles: Getty Research 
Institute, 2002); Anon., “Not Carved in Stone: the British should look again at the 
issue of returning the Elgin Marbles to Greece,” The Economist 354, no. 8162, 18 
March 2000, 21; Barry Came, “Will Britain Lose its Marbles?,” Maclean’s, 13 
December 1999: 33-34; Anon., “Stones to Die For,” 85; O’Driscoll, “Ancient Art at 
Center of Dispute.”   
53 Margaret Loftus and Thomas K. Grose, “They’ve Lost Their Marbles: Greece and 
others try to get treasures back,” U.S. News & World Report 128, no. 25 (26 June 
2000): 58; Atwood, 139-141; Thompson, 252-253; Welsh, 847. The image of 
‘opening the floodgates’ is recurrent in discussions of the fear of precedent.  See, 
for example, Piers Davies, “The Return of Cultural Heritage to Indigenous Peoples: 
conflict or cooperation,” unpublished paper presented to the International Law 
Association, (Wellington, 2008), 7; Eric Gibson, “Finders Keepers? Antiquities and 
their Origins,” Wall Street Journal, 30 December 2005: W.11; Simpson, Museums 
and Repatriation, 80. 
102                                                                                               E H Caswell 
fact that they appear to represent all things to all thinkers on the 
subject, and have been used to underpin a number of arguments 
both for and against repatriation in general, and the repatriation of 
antiquities more specifically: for example the distinction between 
‘cultural nationalists’ and ‘cultural internationalists’ made by John 
Henry Merryman,54 the importance of historical relativism and 
context when assessing repatriation claims,55 or the question of 
whether or not cultural continuity has a bearing on claims for 
repatriation.56  Even taking the single example of the Elgin Marbles, 
                                               
54 Merryman, "Thinking About the Elgin Marbles", 26, 61-62; See also John Henry 
Merryman, “Cultural Property Ethics,” in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: critical 
essays on cultural property, art and law, ed. John Henry Merryman (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000); John Henry Merryman, “The Retention of Cultural 
Property,” in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: critical essays on cultural property, 
art and law, ed. John Henry Merryman (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2000); John Henry Merryman, “A Licit Trade in Cultural Objects,” in Thinking About 
the Elgin Marbles: critical essays on cultural property, art and law, ed. John Henry 
Merryman (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000); Sarah Eagan, “Preserving 
Cultural Property: Our Public Duty: a look at how and why we must create 
international laws that support international action,” Pace International Law Review 
13 (2001): 414-416. The concept has been criticised by some as a ‘crude 
dichotomy’. James A. R. Nafziger and Ann Nicgorski, “Conference on Cultural 
Heritage Issues: the legacy of conquest, colonization and commerce, Williamette 
University, Salem, Oregon October 12-14 2006,” International Journal of Cultural 
Property 14 (2007): 446; A third category, that of cultural intra-nationalists, or those 
within a nation who seek repatriation from a dominant group, is an interesting one, 
with ramifications for the return of cultural property in settler societies, but has not 
been widely developed thus far. Watkins, “Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists 
and “Intra-nationalists.” 
55
 The contemporary legality of Elgin’s actions is not a given, and has been much 
debated.  See, for example, Christopher Hitchens, “The Elgin Marbles,” in The Elgin 
Marbles: should they be returned to Greece?, ed. Christopher Hitchens (London: 
Verso, 1997), 27-32; Merryman, “Thinking About the Elgin Marbles,” 35-40; 
Greenfield, 73, 81; Atwood, 134-135. 
56 Hitchens, “The Elgin Marbles,” 90. Similarly, indigenous groups are often seen 
through a lens of a so-called ‘authentic’ culture, frozen at some point in the past, 
with modern communities seen to be somehow inauthentic for having evolved and 
adapted their practices in response to external and internal influences. Denis Byrne, 
“Heritage as Social Action,” in The Heritage Reader, ed. Graham Fairclough et al. 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 151, 164; Pia Altieri, “Knowledge, Negotiation and 
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therefore, it is possible to argue that the debate surrounding the 
repatriation of antiquities affects repatriation more generally,57 with 
the same arguments permeating discussions of the repatriation of 
indigenous cultural property in public forums.58  As the preeminent 
example of a claim for repatriation, the Elgin Marbles have even, in 
some cases, been referred to directly in media discussions of the 
return of indigenous cultural property, providing the public with a 
frame of reference through which to understand another category 
of debated material.59  A room of sculptures in London, therefore, 
has seen its influence extend until it has become a symbol for 
anyone with an opinion on repatriation. 
The influence of the debate around the repatriation of 
antiquities is not purely rhetorical however, and it is important not 
to relegate indigenous people and their cultural property solely to 
the past, in the form of historic collections and grievances and moral 
arguments for return.  Although the basis of many was firmly 
established, ethnographic collections did not cease to exist or 
expand with the end of the colonial period, and indigenous groups 
in many parts of the world have continued throughout to struggle to 
                                                                                                   
NAGPRA: reconceptualizing repatriation discourse(s),” in Law and Religion in 
Contemporary Society: communities, individualism and the state, ed. Peter W. Edge 
and Graham Harvey (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 141; Arapata T. Hakiwai, “The 
Search for Legitimacy: museums in Aotearoa, New Zealand – a Maori viewpoint,” in 
Heritage, Museums and Galleries: an introductory reader, ed. Gerard Corsane 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 156; Brian Durrans, “The Future of the Other: changing 
cultures on display in ethnographic museums,” in The Museum Time Machine, ed. 
Robert Lumley (London: Routledge, 1988), 144-145; Simpson, Making 
Representations, 35, 251; D. Thomas, 211; N. Thomas, 15; Gerstenblith, “Identity 
and Cultural Property,” 627; Welsh, 843-844. 
57 See, for example, the recurring references to the Elgin Marbles in the work of 
Kathleen Fine-Dare on repatriation of indigenous cultural property. Fine-Dare, 17, 
43. 
58 See, for example, the discussion of the different sides of the debate, the 
argument for historical relativism and the importance of context with respect to 
Native American cultural property in Edward Rothstein, “Antiquities, the World is 
Your Homeland,” New York Times, 27 May 2008. 
59 Ibid., with reference to the Greek case for repatriation. 
104                                                                                               E H Caswell 
retain cultural property or have it returned to them.  Similar 
challenges are faced by source countries of antiquities, although 
distinctions are sometimes made between the continuity of the 
different cultures compared to indigenous descendents. 60   
Legislation and institutional policies related to more recent 
collecting is one area, aside from lending weight to arguments, in 
which overlap between approaches to the two contested categories 
can be felt.  Legislation and policies relating to the protection and 
repatriation of antiquities have not tended to include indigenous 
cultural property as a distinct category subject to repatriation in the 
same way as have some policies relating to human remains.  The 
piece of international legislation most discussed in relation to the 
removal and return of antiquities and other cultural property is the 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property 1970 (UNESCO 
1970). 61    While the Convention’s definition of cultural property is 
wide, and left to be defined by each state when implementing it,62 
the fact that it does not retroactively apply to cases before 1970 has 
obvious disadvantages for those who lay claim to items of 
indigenous cultural property, most of which had entered 
ethnographic collections well before this time.  UNESCO 1970 is 
further limited by the fact that it applies only to those countries who 
                                               
60 A similar definition of the category of antiquities seems to be employed by James 
Cuno. James Cuno, “Introduction,” in Whose Culture?: the promise of museums and 
the debate over antiquities, ed. James Cuno (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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be antiquities. See, for example, Aaron Kyle Briggs, “Consequences of the Met-Italy 
Accord for the International Restitution of Cultural Property,” Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 7, no. 2 (2007), 624. 
61 UNESCO, “Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970,” available 
online at UNESCO.org, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001333/133378mo.pdf (accessed 26 May 
2015). See also Roger W. Mastalir, “A Proposal for Protecting the “Cultural” and 
“Property” Aspects of Cultural Property under International Law,” Fordham 
International Law Journal 16 (1992-1993), 1040-1042. 
62 UNESCO, “Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing.” 
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have become party to it, and requires domestic legislation in order 
to enact it.63  Cultural property, both indigenous and antique, is 
further protected from contemporary removal or export in 
commercial or military contexts by international agreements such as 
UNESCO’s Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the 
Convention 1954 (Hague 1954), the 1999 Second Protocol to this 
                                               
63 U.S. Department of State, “Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
1983,” available online at Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs 
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Cultural Property 8, no. 1 (1999), 110; Ellen Herscher, “International Control Efforts: 
are there any good solutions?,” in The Ethics of Collecting Cultural Property: whose 
culture? whose property? 2
nd
 ed., ed. Phyllis Mauch Messenger (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1999), 117; Nina R. Lenzner, “The Illicit 
International Trade in Cultural Property: does the UNIDROIT Convention provide an 
effective remedy for the shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?,” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 15 (1994-1995): 477-480; Piers 
Davies and Paul Myburgh, “The Protected Objects Act in New Zealand: too little, 
too late?,” International Journal of Cultural Property 15 (2008), 328-333; Barbara T. 
Hoffman, “International Art Transactions and the Resolution of Art and Cultural 
Property Disputes: a United States perspective,” in Art and Cultural Heritage: law, 
policy and practice, ed. Barbara T. Hoffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 162; Briggs, 631-633. 
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document, and the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT)’s 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT 1995),64  the latter of which 
aims to overcome difficulties in enacting legislation such as UNESCO 
1970 because of the incompatibility of different national laws.  
Furthermore, legislation is found in many countries which protects 
certain categories of cultural material from export after a certain 
date, often by vesting ownership of some categories of material in 
the state.65  The majority of the legislative frameworks, on 
                                               
64 UNIDROIT; UNESCO, “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 
1954,” available online at UNESCO.org, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000824/082464mb.pdf (accessed 26 May 
2015);  Neil Brodie, Jenny Doole and Peter Watson, Stealing History: the illicit trade 
in cultural material (Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 
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65 For discussion of some national export prohibition laws, see, for example, Briggs; 
Herscher; William G. Pearlstein, “Claims for the Repatriation of Cultural Property: 
prospects for a managed antiquities market,” Law and Policy in International 
Business 28, no. 1 (1996); Jordana Hughes, “The Trend Toward Liberal Enforcement 
of Repatriation Claims in Cultural Property Disputes,” George Washington Journal of 
International Law and Economics 33, no. 1 (2000); William G. Pearlstein, “Cultural 
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examination, do not specifically exclude indigenous cultural 
property as a category of material which may have been stolen, 
looted or illegally exported.  Legislation for the protection of cultural 
property, despite its limitations of enactment, timeframes and 
categorization of cultural property, has however been used in high-
profile cases in a number of countries in cases where the movement 
of indigenous cultural property was disputed.66 
  This body of legislation has proved most useful in the 
protection of recently removed cultural property, particularly that 
which is well-documented and can be shown beyond doubt to have 
been removed since UNESCO 1970 or the relevant domestic 
legislation was enacted.  High profile examples of the repatriation of 
antiquities as a direct result of UNESCO 1970 include the return of a 
gold wreath, marble statue, relief and stele from the Getty Museum 
to Greece in 2006, and the return of 156 Xia and Ming Dynasty items 
from Denmark to China in 2008.67  Importantly, though, the efficacy 
of this legislation has not been solely in the area of illicitly excavated 
and exported antiquities.  One case involving the organised removal 
of indigenous cultural property in recent decades was the theft and 
subsequent repatriation of the textiles sacred to the Aymara people 
of Coroma, Bolivia, removed for sale in the 1970s-80s.68  The 
framework established in the United States for the implementation 
of UNESCO 1970, as well as existing United States Customs Service 
                                               
66 See, for example, Greenfield, 307-311; Sherry, 522-523. 
67 The repatriations to China were a result of a formal claim under UNESCO 1970, 
while the return of items from the Getty was the result of an institutional policy 
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http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=36505&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 26 May 
2015). 
68
 Susan Lobo, “The Fabric of Life: repatriating the sacred Coroma textiles,” Cultural 
Survival 15, no. 3 (1991); Cristina Bubba Zamora, “Collectors Versus Native Peoples: 
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guidelines on the import and export of cultural property, were 
useful in successfully repatriating some of this stolen cultural 
property.69  Importantly, the weavings, once repatriated to Bolivia, 
were not claimed by national collections, but underwent a further 
domestic repatriation to indigenous communities.70   
Other cases in which legal action has been brought against 
illegal exporters, importers or purchasers of antiquities have helped 
to bring issues surrounding cultural property in general to much 
greater public notice.71  First and foremost among these is 
undoubtedly the indictment by the Italian courts of Marion True, 
former curator of antiquities at the Getty Museum in Los Angeles, 
for her involvement, along with antiquities dealer Robert Hecht, in 
the purchasing of smuggled antiquities.72  Subsequent to this case, 
the Getty Museum has brought its institutional policies in line with 
UNESCO 1970, and has repatriated a substantial number of 
antiquities from its collections to both Italy and Greece.73  Such 
examples form part of a body of court cases, instances of return, 
and news media stories debating unethical, illicit, illegal or best 
practice institutional standards on the part of museums large and 
small.74  Discussion of cultural property issues brought into the 
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 See, for example, Angela M. H. Schuster, “Repatriation Games,” Art & Auction 
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public domain by cases of trafficked antiquities has not been limited 
to legal questions, furthermore, but has also involved the 
consideration of the importance of cultural property to a people’s 
sense of identity and heritage.  Public opinion, for the most part, is 
critical of institutional practices which are revealed to be 
questionable, and supportive of efforts to return antiquities 
acquired in unethical circumstances to their original locations, as 
well as the reunification of collections and fragmented objects.75  All 
of these developments, while they have predominantly affected the 
market for and collection of antiquities, have clear implications for 
indigenous cultural property, from greater scrutiny of collecting 
practices to practical precedents for repatriation claims.76  Whether 
strengthening an argument or providing a legal framework to 
challenge the removal or export of indigenous cultural property, 
therefore, there has once again been a fruitful overlap between this 
category of contested material and another strand of the 
repatriation debate. 
 
2.3 ‘Looted’ Art and the Return of Indigenous Cultural Property 
 A further area of debate in the discussion surrounding 
repatriation from institutional (and private) collections are the 
artworks and artefacts taken from their owners in times of conflict.  
                                                                                                   
policy, cultural property, and the law, ed. Kate Fitz Gibbon (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2005), 154; Brodie, “Smoke and Mirrors,” 9-11; Watson; 
Renfrew; Cuno, Who Owns Antiquity?, 1, 31; Anthony Browne and Pierre Valentin, 
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law, ed. Kate Fitz Gibbon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 98-
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Such objects are often referred to as ‘looted art’.  While the largest 
displacement of art and artefacts yet seen took place during World 
War II, particularly in areas occupied by Nazi and Soviet forces, the 
issue of the removal of cultural property in times of war has a long 
history in the treaties and legislation of many countries, often being 
traced back to the movement of cultural property during the 
Napoleonic Wars.77  The legacy of the Napoleonic Wars of the early 
nineteenth century in terms of the treatment of cultural property in 
times of conflict is generally agreed to have continued throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in documents such as 
the 1863 Lieber Code, 1874 Declaration of Brussels and 1933 League 
                                               
77 Interestingly, the term ‘cultural property’, like the term ‘reparations’ was 
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(London: Routledge, 2002), 201; David Wilson, “Return and Restitution: a museum 
perspective,” in Who Owns the Past?, ed. Isabel McBryde (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 103; Elazar Barkan, “Amending Historical Injustices: the 
restitution of cultural property – an overview,” in Claiming the Stones/Naming the 
Bones: cultural property and the negotiation of national and ethnic identity, ed. 
Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2002), 18; 
Michael F. Brown, “Heritage as Property,” in Property in Question: value 
transformation in the global economy, ed. Katherine Verdey and Caroline Humphrey 
(Oxford: Berg, 2004), 53; Kate Fitz Gibbon, “Chronology of Cultural Property 
Legislation,” in Who Owns the Past? cultural policy, cultural property, and the law, 
ed. Kate Fitz Gibbon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 3; 
Michael J. Kurtz, America and the Return of Nazi Contraband: the recovery of 
Europe’s cultural treasures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3-7; 
Peter Gathercole, “The Repatriation of Ethnographic Objects,” RAIN 46, no. 2 
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of Nations Roerich Pact.78  It should be noted, however, that the 
model of cultural property protection developed in response to the 
Napoleonic campaigns and reinforced thereafter applied 
predominantly to conflicts between European or Western 
combatants.  It was not until the advent of Hague 1954 that this 
protection was extended to the other peoples of the world, and in 
many senses such notions continue not to apply to many modern 
conflicts which include ideological or religious groups as 
combatants, or to conflicts where the destruction of cultural 
property is used as a tool of terror or oppression.79 High profile 
cases of artworks repatriated after twentieth-century looting do not 
tend to share common geographical or cultural origins with 
indigenous cultural property, but they do share other similarities, 
including the unequal power relations which led to their original 
removal.  Furthermore, in debating the potential repatriation of 
looted art, moral arguments are often privileged over legal rights of 
possession.  It is in this aspect, rather than the impact of traditional 
and modern legal mechanisms for the return of looted property, 
that the greatest effect on the repatriation of indigenous cultural 
property can be seen.    
The Hague Convention was first and foremost a response to the 
looting of artworks and other items of cultural property shortly 
before, during and after World War II.80  This looting, which was for 
the most part a result of Nazi policies and expansion through Europe 
(but also took place in Soviet-occupied areas)81 represented the 
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most organised and extensive removal of cultural property yet seen 
during any period of war or peace.82  By the end of World War II, 
tens of thousands of artworks had been taken from their original 
owners, including a small number removed by liberating or 
occupying troops during the last stages of the war.83  Just as this 
period had represented the largest-scale looting yet seen, it then 
became the largest attempt at the restitution of cultural property as 
the war ended and the occupation of Germany and the Cold War 
began.  Due to the sheer volume of works involved, the variety of 
fates which may have befallen them, as well as the destruction of 
documentation, unprecedented numbers of deaths, and mass 
displacement of refugees, the task of attempting to reunite artworks 
with their owners was overwhelming.84  The decision to return 
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artworks to countries rather than owners as a result of these 
challenges, while it was the most expeditious method at the time, 
has also caused ongoing controversy, particularly when cultural 
property was claimed by refugees moving between legal 
jurisdictions, or returned to and subsequently nationalised by 
socialist governments.85  The foundation for later international 
conventions on cultural property,86 Hague 1954 is seen by many as 
the ultimate statement of the ‘cultural internationalist’ position, or 
the importance of cultural property as the heritage of all mankind.87  
The Hague Convention attempts to protect both movable and 
immovable cultural property from deliberate or accidental 
destruction, looting or vandalism.  Building on a historic 
international legal foundation, as well as the idea that cultural 
property is the heritage and responsibility of all humanity, Hague 
1954 has helped to reshape ideas around the treatment of cultural 
property during times of conflict.  And as one scholar has noted, 
“[a]lthough the 1954 Hague Convention has no direct application to 
the protection of cultural property during peacetime or the 
prevention of illicit trade, it established key concepts incorporated in 
                                               
85 L. Nicholas, 323, 382-383, 413-414, 429; N. Palmer, Museums and the Holocaust, 
125; Kurtz, 182-183. 
86
 John Mulvaney, “A Question of Values: museums and cultural property,” in Who 
Owns the Past?, ed. Isabel McBryde (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), 89. 
87 Hughes, 136; Greenfield, 365; Herscher, 120; Barkan, “Amending Historical 
Injustices,” 22, Merryman, “Thinking About the Elgin Marbles,” 56-57; John Henry 
Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property,” American Journal of 
International Law 80, no. 4 (1986), 831-832; André Emmerich, “Improving the 
Odds: preservation through distribution,” in Who Owns the Past?: cultural policy, 
cultural property, and the law, ed. Kate Fitz Gibbon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2005), 247; Jane Warring, “Underground Debates: the 
fundamental differences of opinion that thwart UNESCO’s progress in fighting the 
illicit trade in cultural property,” Emory International Law Review 227 (2005): 246. 
Other scholars have seen it as a Western perspective, which dismisses the 
ownership which some groups would claim over their own history.  See, for 
example, Larry J. Zimmerman, “Plains Indians and Resistance to “Public” Heritage 
Commemoration of Their Pasts,” in Cultural Heritage and Human Rights, ed. 
Helaine Silverman and D. Fairchild Ruggles (New York: Springer, 2007). 
114                                                                                               E H Caswell 
later treaties on these topics.”88 
In 1999 a Second Protocol was added to Hague 1954.89  In 
response to phenomena seen for example in the Balkans or in Iraq, 
this Protocol was designed to create a new system for the enhanced 
protection of the most important cultural property, by establishing 
individual criminal responsibility for the theft or destruction of such 
property during times of war, as well as imposing increased 
responsibility to prevent illicit exports on occupying powers and 
improving the protection of cultural property in civil conflicts.90  On 
a smaller scale, in 2007, the Department of the Army of the United 
States provided further protection by preparing a ‘Civil Affairs Arts, 
Monuments and Archives Guide’ to aid soldiers on active duty in the 
recognition and protection of cultural property.91  The Guide 
implements the Hague Convention principles to which the United 
States is not officially party, and summarises the overall task at hand 
as follows: “The cultural heritage of a country is the legacy of 
physical artifacts and intangible  attributes of a group or 
society that are inherited from past generations, maintained  in 
the present, and bestowed for the benefit of future generations.  In 
the past,  plunder has often followed warfare and natural 
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disaster.”92 
 “Because of its emotional context, cultural property is 
particularly vulnerable in  times of conflict.  Combatants may 
exact political retribution by targeting symbols of  their 
enemies’ cultural identity.  There is also the matter of  competing 
priorities for  limited resources in securing the cultural properties.  
There is the temptation for  wanton looting and destruction for 
either money or power.”93 In the years between the Hague 
Convention of 1954, its Second Protocol of 1999 and the 
preparation of this last document in 2007, it is apparent that certain 
ideas about cultural property have evolved and been disseminated 
to a wide audience.94  The main benefit of Hague 1954 and its 
protocols, therefore, may not be in the protection of specific 
manifestations or categories of cultural property, but rather in 
raising awareness of the importance of all cultural property to the 
people to whom it belongs, and the need to protect it under even 
the most difficult circumstances. 
 The impact of the repatriation of looted artworks on that of 
indigenous cultural property is not solely in the field of international 
treaties, however.  As a further specific response to the looting of 
cultural property during World War II, a number of countries, 
including Russia, Austria and the United States, have made 
exceptions to rules on stolen property, statutes of limitations or the 
ability of museums or other institutions to deaccession items, or 
issued national guidelines, in recognition of the special nature of 
this period of looting in history.95  In many legal systems, this has the 
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added effect of establishing a possible precedent to be drawn on in 
later cases for repatriation.96  The case in Austria of two paintings by 
Egon Schiele, for example, which came to light when the works were 
loaned to New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 1998, caused the 
Austrian government to change its position on the return of 
artworks stolen during the World War II period to a more favorable 
one for claimants.97  In the late 1990s, the Washington Conference 
on Holocaust Era Assets established recommended principles for 
dispute resolution, while the results of a hearing in the House of 
Representatives on the repatriation of Holocaust-era assets were 
published in 2006, including discussion of guidelines and assessment 
of the handling of previous cases.98  Nevertheless, the situation for 
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claimants varies from country to country, sometimes affected by 
legislation around deaccessioning items from museum collections, 
as in the United Kingdom where the merits of creating a bespoke 
response to this particular historic situation have been debated for 
some time.99 
The responses to the looting of artworks and cultural 
property during World War II have, in the decades since the end of 
war, extended beyond legislative chambers.  As one author has 
noted: “[f]or essentially the first time in history, the international art 
community launched a coordinated campaign to repatriate stolen 
art and revise museum acquisition policies.”100  Some claims for 
return have been carried out in emotional rhetoric in the media, 
while others, including the return of a fourteenth-century 
manuscript to Vienna in 2003, are the result of enforcement of 
existing guidelines or policies (in this case those of the US Customs 
Service).101  In some instances, museums and other good-faith 
purchasers have taken legal action against dealers or others who 
misled them as to the provenance of certain objects, thereby 
assigning accountability to more parties than merely the possessors 
and claimants.102  The media and public scrutiny over the issue of art 
looted during World War II Holocaust, as well as the desire to act 
ethically and transparently, has led many museums to improve their 
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self-regulation in terms of guidelines for acquisitions, loans and 
provenance research.103  The most important effect of the 
repatriation of ‘looted’ artworks and cultural property on the wider 
repatriation movement has thus been a reframing of the terms in 
which the return of cultural property and disputes surrounding it is 
seen.  Because of factors including the dispersal of artworks and 
people, the semi-legal transfer of some property, the difficulty in 
tracing stolen works of art, and the barriers imposed by statutes of 
limitations and other legal requirements, the return of items stolen 
under Nazi policies to the original owners or their heirs is often 
portrayed as an ethical rather than strictly legal issue, in which 
exceptions can be made or moral pressure brought to bear on 
current possessors in order to ensure the desired outcome.104  It has 
been noted that “[e]thical standards and regulatory laws usually 
follow public demand; public demand concentrates on specific 
situations that need to be redressed.”105   The fact that these 
standards, guidelines and policies have the ability to throw doubts 
over the previous methods of acquisition not only of artworks but of 
other areas of museum collections shows the importance which the 
repatriation of looted cultural property has had, even if one is to 
look only at the example of World War II.106  Once again, public 
education and media attention have played a key role in ensuring 
that the profile of looted art claims remains high, and developing 
and adapting solutions become necessary as the result of public 
scrutiny and opinion. 107  It should also be noted that in some 
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discussions these links are not merely potential, but rather specific 
links have been drawn between the repatriation of World War II 
looted art and that of indigenous cultural property.108 
There are, nonetheless, limitations to the extent to which 
World War II and the Nazi looting of artworks and cultural property 
can be used as a model or foundation for supporters of other 
repatriation claims.  Although statutes of limitations have in some 
cases been extended or altered in order to show more leniency 
towards Holocaust victims or their heirs, for example, most of the 
relevant exceptions, guidelines and legislation excludes items looted 
or taken before World War II.  Furthermore, some scholars have 
foreseen the end of the current high profile of reparations or 
repatriation from this period, as Holocaust-related claims are settled 
and the number of remaining possible claimants dwindles.109  
Whether the benefits of the links between looted art, repatriation in 
general and the repatriation of indigenous cultural property in 
particular can survive the end of claims related to Nazi or World War 
II-era looting remains to be seen. 
 
4. Internal influences in repatriation: possible future directions 
 
The preceding pages have discussed the various ways in which 
different categories of material claimed for repatriation affect one 
another, taking the example of the effect on the return of 
indigenous cultural property.  While each category is contested as a 
result of particular circumstances, both modern and historic, and 
any claim for return demands the negotiation of national and 
international legislation, institutional policies, successful or 
unsuccessful precedents, moral and ethical arguments and public 
opinion,110 it is possible to recognise some trends across the 
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different types of repatriation described above.  While this is partly 
an exercise in hypothesis, it is also firmly grounded in an analysis of 
claims, laws, case studies, public discussions, policies and guidelines 
relating to repatriation as they have evolved thus far. 
The first trend meriting further discussion is that which sees 
indigenous cultural property included in legislation or policies which 
aim to facilitate the repatriation of another category of material.  
This is not to say that the repatriation of indigenous cultural 
property is always an accidental side effect, but rather that it was 
not necessarily the original intention of those proposing, 
supporting, drafting, or lobbying for these laws.  In some cases, 
where the definition of cultural property eligible for protection is 
vague enough, it is possible to adapt and utilise the legislation to 
pursue claims for different categories of objects, including 
indigenous cultural property, while in others, the protection of a 
category of material seen to be related to indigenous cultural 
property has led to this group of objects being specifically included.  
Such laws have been promulgated at both the international and 
national levels.  UNESCO 1970 and UNIDROIT 1995 are both 
examples of international legislation in which the definition of 
protected cultural property is sufficiently broad to apply to both 
indigenous cultural property and other contested categories.111   
International agreements such as these are equally important for 
the effect which they have on domestic legislation in turn.  Both of 
these agreements have been important for the implementation of 
legislation in various nations through which indigenous cultural 
property enjoys increased protection and mechanisms for 
repatriation to the original owners or their descendents.112     It 
should be remembered here, furthermore, that in a number of 
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cases domestic legislation on the sale or movement of stolen 
property has also been used successfully to return items of cultural 
property to claimants, despite not being covered specifically by such 
laws.  Other legal responses to the issue of repatriation have 
specifically included indigenous cultural property as a category 
within their purview, even if this may not have been the lawmakers’ 
original intent.  The preeminent example of this is the 1990 NAGPRA 
in the United States,113  but similar provisions are made for example 
in the National Museum of the American Indian Act (NMAIA) of 
1989 (which provides for repatriation in a similar fashion to 
NAGPRA, but applies only to the Smithsonian Institution), and 
various state laws,114  and indigenous cultural property does not 
only enjoy specific protection and provisions for repatriation in the 
United States, but in a number of other countries as well.115 
Going hand-in-hand with the wider context of increasingly 
multicultural societies, the growing visibility of indigenous rights 
movements, and the recognition of non-Western points of view,116 
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the trend towards inclusion of issues relating to the repatriation of 
indigenous cultural property in national and international legislation 
seems likely to continue.  This may be through an increase in 
specifically enacted legislation, as seen in the United States’ 
NAGPRA and NMAIA, through the extension of existing legal 
approaches outside the confines of settler societies to former 
colonial centres, or through the successful adaptation of general 
repatriation or stolen property statutes to indigenous cultural 
property claims in more countries than has been the case thus far.  A 
related trend specific to the repatriation of indigenous cultural 
property, and one which also seems likely to continue, is the 
adoption of principles and guidelines favorable to the protection or 
repatriation of this category of material by institutions or 
professional organisations worldwide.117  While most such policies 
focus on ethical and legal acquisitions rather than dispositions from 
museum collections, and the majority do not specifically mention 
the return of indigenous cultural property (human remains are a 
more common subject of regulation), this is not always the case.  
The International Council of Museums (ICOM), for example, has 
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produced statements in favour of the return of important cultural 
property to source communities,118 and general museum policy in 
some countries is now in favour of culturally appropriate curation of 
indigenous collections and the return of some objects to community 
groups.119  As a form of extrajudicial regulation of museum practices 
relating to indigenous cultural property these guidelines, 
statements, principles and policies will continue to affect the way 
that repatriation claims develop either in support of or as an 
alternative to any relevant legislation.  Such documents tend to have 
a ‘trickle-down’ application, as national organisations adopt 
guidelines in keeping with national or international viewpoints on 
repatriation; these become binding on members, or are adopted in 
turn in the policies of affiliated institutions.  Political fluctuations 
may have a bearing in some countries, as in the legislation recently 
passed in Australia in 2013 to limit Aboriginal claims against loaned 
objects,120 but in any event, it seems that in the future an increasing 
number of institutions will be legally obliged, or will take it upon 
themselves, to return items of indigenous cultural property in their 
collections to source communities.   
Another way in which the repatriation of indigenous cultural 
property is affected by developments in the wider field of 
repatriation from museum and institutional collections is through 
the establishment of precedent.  Precedents take the form both of 
concrete cases used subsequently to build trends in favour of 
repatriation in legal or institutional settings, and high-profile 
examples around which debates and viewpoints form on 
repatriation in general, or certain categories of disputed material in 
particular.  Given the rise in successful repatriation claims over the 
                                               
118 Including in its 2001 Code of Ethics for Museums. ICOM, ICOM Code of Ethics for 
Museums (revised 2004) (Paris: ICOM, 2006), 9-10. 
119 Unless quoting other works, this term is used in the context of the indigenous 
peoples of Australia, rather than indigenous peoples in general. 
120
 See discussion in Norman Palmer, “Itinerant Art and the Architecture of 
Immunity from Legal Process: questions of policy and drafting,” Art, Antiquity and 
Law 16:1 (2011), 1-23. 
124                                                                                               E H Caswell 
preceding decades, the previously-discussed trends towards 
legislation and guidelines to increase the protection and return of 
indigenous cultural property, and the importance of certain case 
studies to scholarly work and discussion around repatriation, it 
seems certain that the establishment and use of precedents will 
continue to impact upon all categories of material claimed for 
repatriation both now and in the future.   
One location in which the establishment of precedent is key is 
found in the legal arena.  While infractions of relevant legislation are 
needed in order to bring criminal or civil cases, the outcome of 
complex cases is often decided by the successful or unsuccessful 
arguing of a legal precedent.  For repatriation claims under common 
law systems, legal precedents can make the difference between the 
return of artefacts to their original communities or source countries, 
or their retention by current owners.121  In the literature on 
repatriation claims, it is possible to trace the legal precedents which 
have had the largest impact on subsequent cases.122  Not all 
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precedents, however, are legal.  Equally important to the 
development of the repatriation movement are practical and 
theoretical precedents upon which actions and arguments can be 
based.  A major stumbling block in the attempt to have any kind of 
contested material repatriated, including indigenous cultural 
property, for example, is the unwillingness of museums and other 
institutions to create a practical precedent in favour of return.  If an 
overly lenient precedent were to be established, the fear of some 
museum professionals is that a surge of repatriation claims would 
follow, resulting in the emptying of storerooms and collections 
around the world.123  Similarly, many proponents of the return of 
indigenous cultural property to source communities rely on 
precedents when they refer to successfully concluded claims for 
similar or related material.124  By referring to precedents with similar 
circumstances or underlying moral arguments, it is possible in some 
cases for those advocating the repatriation of indigenous cultural 
property to strengthen their arguments in the eyes of museum 
professionals and the public, perhaps even to the point of ensuring 
success.  Who is to say, furthermore, that other trends within the art 
world, such as the repatriation of certain categories of object via the 
art market and private purchases, may not help to set a precedent 
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for claimants of indigenous cultural property?125   
A final way in which major repatriation cases operate as a kind 
of precedent is in the underpinning of arguments for or against the 
return of cultural property.  As the preeminent case of a historic 
repatriation claim, it is the belief of the author that the Elgin 
Marbles, for example, will continue to form the basis of arguments 
over the retention or return of cultural property for as long as they 
continue to exist in any location.  Similarly, as long as Holocaust-
related claims continue to be resolved and human remains continue 
to form part of museum collections, the merits of upholding ethical 
over legal or scientific over emotional principles in deciding claims 
for return, and the idea of restitution as a means of making amends 
for historical injustices will continue to be debated, with an obvious 
effect on historic cases of contested indigenous cultural property.126  
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As repatriation cases of all types continue to be concluded with 
either returns or retention, it will be possible for those on both sides 
of the repatriation debate, including the return of indigenous 
cultural property, to build up their stocks of precedents upon which 
to rely.  This trend is one which will continue to flourish for as long 
as repatriation claims, particularly high-profile ones, are brought. 
A final trend which is likely to continue to be of importance to 
developments in repatriation is that of the influence of public 
opinion.  As discussed in previous chapters, both museum 
professionals and other commentators have discussed the ways in 
which public opinion can lead to a particular outcome in a 
repatriation case, or preference for a particular course of action 
when faced with an issue within the repatriation debate.  In the case 
of human remains, even institutions which are initially reluctant to 
return ancestral remains to indigenous communities can be 
influenced by public opinion which favours their repatriation over 
curation.  While in some cases public opinion is expressed in 
opposition to the return of objects from museum collections, for 
example well-known or favourite items, or items which, once 
returned, may be sold and enter the domain of the private collector, 
the prevailing trend in public opinion seems to be in favour of the 
repatriation of certain categories of material in certain 
circumstances.127  As acknowledgement of non-Western values 
continues to grow in the wider professional, national and 
international communities, it is very likely that the arguments now 
applied to collections of skeletal remains will be applied with more 
frequency and success to ethnographic and other collections 
containing indigenous cultural property.  While the extent to which 
Holocaust-era claims for the return of works of cultural property will 
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be ongoing is questioned by some, connections between such 
claims and those for the repatriation of indigenous cultural property 
have already been established.  The drawing of similarities between 
one type of claim and another which is more easily understood and 
digested by the public is a useful technique for harnessing support 
which may be crucial in lobbying for legislation, encouraging 
changes in policies, or influencing decisions on particular 
repatriation claims.   
 Whether in benefiting from legislation or gathering public 
support, and whether from the fields of human remains, antiquities 
or looted art, therefore, there are many interactions within the 
repatriation movement which affect the return of indigenous 
cultural property.  The trends drawn out in the last section of this 
work are broad ones, but nonetheless provide an indication for both 
museum practitioners and those arguing the other side of the 
repatriation debate of where the overlaps within this broad topic 
occur, and where precedents, arguments or frameworks can be 
found which may work either for or against a particular claim for 
repatriation.  Further work could be done on the areas in which 
another of the categories within the repatriation debate has been 
affected by the wider movement,128 or indeed on how external 
shifts and fluctuations, whether political, economic or social, affect 
these internal interactions, but the fact remains that repatriation 
will continue to affect museum collections and practice, as well as 
the communities or individuals claiming items, for many years to 
come, and a greater understanding of how the repatriation debate 
functions and develops is invaluable for all concerned. 
  
                                               
128 See, for example, a proposal to enact legislation similar to NAGPRA to protect 
looted art in Akhtar, 325-346. 
